ARP Cache Mechanics and Poisoning Principles
You'll learn how devices store ARP mappings locally and how attackers exploit this cache to redirect network traffic.
How ARP Caches Work
When a device learns an IP-to-MAC address mapping through ARP (as covered in lesson 384), it doesn't immediately forget it. Instead, the device stores this mapping in an ARP cache (or ARP table) — a temporary memory store that speeds up future communications. Think of it like a phone's contact list: once you look up someone's number, you save it so you don't need to ask directory assistance every time.
Entries in the ARP cache typically expire after a few minutes, but while they're active, the device trusts them completely. This is where the vulnerability lies.
Gratuitous ARP
A gratuitous ARP is an ARP response sent without being requested. Devices use it legitimately to announce IP address changes (like when a network card comes online). The catch? Most systems accept gratuitous ARPs and automatically update their cache — no questions asked.
Poisoning Mechanics
ARP cache poisoning (or ARP spoofing) exploits this trust by injecting malicious ARP responses. An attacker broadcasts fake ARP replies claiming "I am 192.168.1.1 (the gateway), and my MAC is AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" — even though that MAC belongs to the attacker's machine, not the real gateway.
Victim devices update their cache with this false mapping. Now, when they try to reach the internet (via 192.168.1.1), their packets go to the attacker instead. The attacker can intercept, modify, or forward the traffic — achieving a man-in-the-middle position.
Key Takeaway: ARP caches store IP-to-MAC mappings temporarily and accept unsolicited updates, allowing attackers to inject false entries and redirect traffic to themselves for interception.