PassRole Permission Exploitation
What you'll learn: How attackers exploit the iam:PassRole permission to escalate privileges by assigning powerful roles to services they control.
What is PassRole?
In cloud environments, certain services need to operate with permissions—think Lambda functions, EC2 instances, or container tasks. The iam:PassRole permission allows a user to hand off (pass) an IAM role to a service. It's like giving someone the key to a company car: you're not driving yourself, but you're deciding who gets to drive.
This permission exists separately from AssumeRole (which you learned about earlier). While AssumeRole lets you become the role, PassRole lets you tell a service to become the role.
The Exploitation Path
Imagine you have permissions to:
- Create a Lambda function (
lambda:CreateFunction) - Pass any role to Lambda (
iam:PassRoleon*)
Even if you can't assume the powerful AdminRole yourself, you can:
- Create a Lambda function that executes code you control
- Pass
AdminRoleto that Lambda - Invoke the Lambda, which now runs with admin privileges
- Extract credentials, modify resources, or execute commands
The service acts as your privilege escalation proxy—you didn't become admin, but your code runs as admin.
Common Attack Vectors
Services frequently exploited via PassRole include:
- Lambda functions (execute arbitrary code)
- EC2 instances (launch instances with privileged roles)
- Glue/DataPipeline jobs (run scripts with passed roles)
- Container services (ECS/Fargate tasks with escalated permissions)
Defensive Measures
Restrict PassRole using resource conditions:
"Action": "iam:PassRole",
"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/LimitedServiceRole"
Never grant PassRole on * without strong justification.
Key Takeaway: PassRole permission allows attackers to indirectly execute actions with privileged roles by creating services under their control—always restrict which roles can be passed to which services.