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Lesson 1169 of 3,05224. Application Security - Input ValidationFree lesson

Overlong UTF-8 Encoding Attacks

Explore how non-shortest form UTF-8 encodings can bypass security filters and validation checks.

Overlong UTF-8 Encoding Attacks

You'll learn how attackers exploit non-standard UTF-8 encodings to sneak malicious input past security filters.

The Core Problem

UTF-8 allows the same character to be encoded in multiple ways—some longer than necessary. For example, the forward slash / should be encoded as 0x2F (one byte), but UTF-8 technically could represent it as 0xC0 0xAF (two bytes) or even longer sequences. These "overlong" encodings are non-standard and prohibited by the UTF-8 specification—but not all validators reject them.

Think of it like writing "cat" as "kat" or "katt"—same sound, different spelling. If a spell-checker only blocks "cat" but accepts the alternatives, you've bypassed the filter.

The Attack

Security filters often scan for dangerous characters like ../ (path traversal), <script> (XSS), or null bytes. If these filters check input before UTF-8 decoding or normalization happens—or if different system layers decode differently—attackers can disguise their payload:

  • Normal: ../../../etc/passwd ← blocked by filter
  • Overlong: .%C0%AF.%C0%AF.%C0%AF ← bypasses filter, decoded as ../ later

The application's security layer sees gibberish and allows it through. Later, when the filesystem or interpreter decodes it into standard UTF-8, the attack payload executes.

Why This Works

Different components may:

  • Decode at different stages
  • Use different decoding libraries with varying strictness
  • Normalize (or fail to normalize) inconsistently

This creates a canonicalization gap—your validator sees one thing, your backend processes another.

Key Takeaway: Always decode and normalize input to its canonical (shortest) UTF-8 form before validation, and reject any overlong or non-standard encodings outright to prevent bypass attacks.