Password Reset Poisoning
What you'll learn: How attackers manipulate Host headers in password reset emails to steal account recovery tokens and take over user accounts.
The Attack Scenario
Password reset poisoning exploits a dangerous trust relationship: many web applications generate password reset links by blindly using the Host header from the incoming HTTP request. When a user requests a password reset, the application sends an email containing a link like:
https://<Host-header-value>/reset?token=secret123
If an attacker can inject a malicious Host header while triggering a legitimate user's password reset, the email will contain a link pointing to the attacker's domain instead of the real application.
How It Works
- Attacker triggers reset for victim's account (victim@example.com) but injects:
Host: evil.com - Application generates token and builds reset link using the poisoned Host header
- Victim receives email with link:
https://evil.com/reset?token=secret123 - Victim clicks the seemingly legitimate link (email came from the real company!)
- Token leaks to attacker's server via the HTTP request
- Attacker uses token on the real site to reset victim's password and hijack the account
Why It's Dangerous
The victim has no reason to suspect the email is compromised—it came from the legitimate service's email address. The malicious domain might even look similar to the real one (examp1e.com vs example.com).
Real-World Impact
This vulnerability has affected major platforms and can bypass multi-factor authentication since password resets often create new sessions from scratch.
Key Takeaway:
Password reset poisoning tricks applications into generating recovery links with attacker-controlled domains by manipulating the Host header, allowing token theft when victims click seemingly legitimate emails.